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EDUCATION-TITLE IX-Receipt By Private College
Students of Basic Educational Opportunity Grants
Constitutes Federal Financial Assistance to the Specific
Program Benefited Thereby Requiring Compliance
With Title IX
Grove City College v. Bell,
-,
104
S. Ct. 1211, 79 L. Ed. 2d 516 (1984).
U.S.
Grove City College, a private, coeducational, liberal arts institution, had,
throughout its history, consistently declined any direct state or federal financial assistance.' Many students enrolled at Grove City College, however,
had received Basic Educational Opportunity Grants (BEOG), under the Alternate Disbursement System of the Department of Education (Department).2 Based on this fact, the Department determined that Grove City
College was a recipient of federal financial assistance and ordered the college
to file an Assurance of Compliance under section 902 of Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972.' When Grove City College refused to
1. See Grove City College v. Bell, - U.S..... 104 S. Ct. 1211, 1214, 79 L. Ed. 2d 516,
523 (1984).
2. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1214-15, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 523; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1070a
(1982). The BEOG is a grant from the federal government to college students to aid in financing a student's education. See id. The grants are based on student financial need. See id.
§ 1070a(2). There are two methods of disbursement of BEOGs. See 34 C.F.R. § 690 (1983).
Under the Regular Disbursement System, the Secretary of Education and the educational institution enter into an agreement in which the Secretary estimates the amount the institution
will need for grants. The Secretary advances that sum to the institution, whereupon the institution selects eligible students and distributes the grants. See id. §§ 690.71-.85. Under the
Alternate Disbursement System, the Secretary and the educational institution enter into an
agreement in which the institution makes appropriate certifications to the Secretary, and the
Secretary calculates and distributes the grant awards directly to eligible students. See id.
§§ 690.91-.96.
3. See Grove City College v. Bell, - U.S..... 104 S. Ct. 1211, 1215, 79 L. Ed. 2d 516,
523-24 (1984); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1982). Section 1682 states:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial
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comply, the Department initiated administrative proceedings against the college. 4 An administrative law judge5 issued an order terminating federal financial assistance until Grove City College corrected its noncompliance with
Title IX. 6 'Grove City College and four of its students then filed suit against
the Secretary of Education in the District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania to contest the Department's order.7 The district court held

assistance to any education program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or contract other
than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed to effectuate the
provisions of section 1681 of this title with respect to such program or activity by issuing
rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with
achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken. No such rule, regulation, or order shall become
effective unless and until approved by the President. Compliance with any requirement
adopted pursuant to this section may be effected (1) by the termination of or refusal to
grant or to continue assistance under such program or activity to any recipient as to
whom there has been an express finding on the record, after opportunity for hearing, of a
failure to comply with such requirement, but such termination or refusal shall be limited
to the particular political entity, or part thereof, or other recipient as to whom such a
finding has been made, and shall be limited in its effect to the particular program, or part
thereof, in which such noncompliance has been so found, or (2) by any other means authorized by law: Provided, however, that no such action shall be taken until the department or agency concerned has advised the appropriate person or persons of the failure to
comply with the requirement and has determined that compliance cannot be secured by
voluntary means. In the case of any action terminating, or refusing to grant or continue,
assistance because of failure to comply with a requirement imposed pursuant to this section, the head of the Federal department or agency shall file with the committees of the
House and Senate having legislative jurisdiction over the program or activity involved a
full written report of the circumstances and the grounds for such action. No such action
shall become effective until thirty days have elapsed after the filing of such report.
Id. Pursuant to this statute, the Department of Education promulgated regulations requiring
institutions to submit an Assurance of Compliance to the Assistant Secretary of Education for
each education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. See 34 C.F.R.
§ 106.4 (1983). The Assurance states that the education program or activity receiving assistance is being operated in compliance with Title IX. See id. If the Assurance of Compliance
submitted is not satisfactory to the Assistant Secretary, the Department may terminate assistance to the education program or activity until it corrects its noncompliance. See id.
4. See Grove City College v. Bell, - U.S.....-, 104 S. Ct. 1211, 1215, 79 L. Ed. 2d 516,
524 (1984). The Department initiated administrative proceedings under the Administrative
Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1982) (general law for all administrative
proceedings).
5. See 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (1982). This section requires administrative agencies to appoint
administrative law judges needed for proceedings conducted in accordance with 5 U.S.C.
§§ 556-557 (1982). See id. § 3105. Section 556 provides that administrative law judges are to
preside over hearings conducted by administrative agencies. See id. § 556. Section 557 provides that the decision of the administrative law judge at the agency hearing is the decision of
the agency conducting the hearing. See id. § 557.
6. See Grove City College v. Bell,

-

U.S ..

104 S. Ct. 1211, 1215, 79 L. Ed. 2d 516,

524 (1984).
7. See Grove City College v. Harris, 500 F. Supp. 253, 256 (W.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd sub
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that the Department could not terminate federal aid to the students.' The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Department had
acted properly when it terminated federal financial assistance to the students
and the college. 9 Grove City College and the four students appealed to the
United States Supreme Court seeking a reversal of the Third Circuit's decision.1" Held-Affirmed. Receipt by private college students of BEOGs constitutes federal financial assistance to the specific program benefited, thereby
requiring compliance with Title IX.1 1
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 was enacted to prohibit
discrimination based on sex in any education program or activity receiving
federal financial assistance. 12 To enforce this primary objective, Title IX
nom. Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684 (3d Cir. 1982), affid, - U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 1211,
79 L. Ed. 2d 516 (1984). Grove City's refusal to complete an Assurance of Compliance was
based on conscience and principle. See id. at 255. Grove City College contended that its
participation in the BEOG program did not cause it to be a "recipient of Federal financial
assistance" and that an interpretation of Title IX which allowed its application to the college
was overbroad. See id. at 255.
8. See Grove City College v. Harris, 500 F. Supp. 253, 273 (W.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd sub
104 S. Ct.
nom. Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684 (3d Cir. 1982), afid, - U.S. -_,
1211, 79 L.Ed. 2d 516(1984).
9.See Grove City College v.Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 705 (3d Cir. 1982), afid, - U.S. -, 104
S. Ct. 1211, 79 L. Ed. 2d 516 (1984).
10. See Grove City College v. Bell, - U.S -... 104 S. Ct. 1211, 1216, 79 L. Ed. 2d 516,
525 (1984).
11. See id. at -, 104 S.Ct. at 1215, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 523.
12. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982). The section provides, in pertinent part: "No person
in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.
...
Id. The legislative history of Title IX is sparse because the
statute was introduced as a floor amendment, and there are no committee reports discussing its
provisions. See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 523-30 (1982) (explains history of Title IX). Title IX was introduced into the Senate by Senator Bayh during debate on
the Education Amendments of 1972. See 118 CONG. REC. 5803 (1972). The purpose of Title
IX was "to avoid the use of federal resources to support discriminatory practices" and to
provide citizens with "effective protection against those practices." See Cannon v. University
of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979); see also 117 CONG. REC. 39,252 (1971) (statement of
Rep. Minton); 118 CONG. REC. 5806-07 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh). Title IX is modeled
after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982). Title VI reads in
pertinent part: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Id. As a result
of the similarity in statutory construction and purpose between Titles IX and VI, the courts
may look to the legislative history of Title VI and case law construing it to aid in interpreting
Title IX. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696-99 (1979); Hillsdale College
v. Department of H.E.W., 696 F.2d 418, 427 (6th Cir. 1982), vacated, - U.S. -,104 S. Ct.
1673, 80 L. Ed. 2d 149 (1984). See generally Note, The ProgramSpecific Reach of Title IX,83
COLUM. L. REV. 1210, 1222-26 (1983) (discussion of legislative histories of Titles VI and IX).
Many cases have dealt with the types of claims covered by Title IX. See, e.g., Brunswick
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provides that the controlling agency, the Department of Education,' 3 may
secure compliance with its provisions by terminating assistance to non-complying institutions. 4 The Department also has the authority to promulgate
and enforce regulations, pursuant to Title IX, that must be complied with by
educational institutions receiving federal financial assistance." One such
regulation requires that educational institutions receiving federal financial
assistance file an Assurance of Compliance.' 6 The Assurance states that the
education program or activity receiving federal monies is being operated in
compliance with the provisions of Title IX and the regulations promulgated

pursuant to the statute. 17

The regulations and requirements arising out of Title IX apply to any
education program or activity which receives federal financial assistance."8

School Bd. v. Califano, 449 F. Supp. 866, 870 (D. Me. 1978) (Title IX protects direct beneficiaries of or participants in federally aided education programs), a/I'd 593 F.2d 424 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Alexander v. Yale Univ., 459 F. Supp. 1, 6 (D. Conn. 1977)
(female student who received poor grade in course due to rejection of male professor's sexual
demands protected by Title IX); North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 530 (1982)
(Title IX protects persons employed by federally aided education programs). But see, e.g.,
O'Connor v. Board of Educ., 545 F. Supp. 376, 384 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (female prohibited from
playing on boy's basketball team at junior high school not. allowed claim under Title IX);
Alexander v. Yale Univ., 459 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D. Conn. 1977) (female student who suffered great
emotional stress on learning another female student was subject of sexual harassment did not
have claim under Title IX); Trent v. Perritt, 391 F. Supp. 171, 173 (S.D. Miss. 1975) (high
school regulation prohibiting only males from wearing long hair did not constitute sex discrimination under Title IX).
13. See 20 U.S.C. § 3441 (1982). Power to promulgate and enforce regulations pursuant
to Title IX was transferred from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to the
Department of Education in 1979. See id.
14. See id. § 1682.
15. See id. § 1682 (Department authorized to issue and enforce rules and regulations to
effectuate Title IX's provisions).
16. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.4(a) (1983). This provision states:
Every application for Federal financial assistance for any education program or activity
shall as condition of its approval contain or be accompanied by an assurance from the
applicant or recipient, satisfactory to the Assistant Secretary, that each education program or activity operated by the applicant or recipient and to which this part applies will
be operated in compliance with this part. An assurance of compliance with this part shall
not be satisfactory to the Assistant Secretary if the applicant or recipient to whom such
assurance applies fails to commit itself to take whatever remedial action is necessary in
accordance with § 106.3(a) to eliminate existing discrimination on the basis of sex or to
eliminate the effects of past discrimination whether occurring prior or subsequent to the
submission to the Assistant Secretary of such assurance.
Id.
17. See id.
18. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1982); see also Brunswick School Bd. v. Califano, 449 F. Supp.
866, 869 (D. Me. 1978) (recognizing Title IX protects students and other participants in education programs receiving federal aid), affd, 593 F.2d 424 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972
(1979); Romeo Community Schools v. United States Dep't of H.E.W., 438 F. Supp. 1021, 1023

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol16/iss4/11

4

Carroll: Education - Title IX - Receipt by Private College Students of Bas

19851

CASENOTE

1019

The Department, pursuant to its authority under Title IX,19 has defined federal financial assistance as government aid extended to educational institutions or to students making payments to the institution.2" Direct assistance,
such as grants made directly to the institution,2" and indirect assistance,
such as grants awarded to students to finance their education at the institution,2 2 come within the definition of federal financial assistance.2 3 The Department has also, pursuant to its authority under Title IX, defined
"recipient" of federal financial assistance as any education program or activity that receives or benefits from federal funds.24 In applying this definition,
the courts have held that there is no difference between direct and indirect
aid in determining whether an institution is a recipient of federal financial
assistance."
Title IX's application to recipients of federal financial assistance is program specific in that it bans sex discrimination in any education program or
activity receiving such assistance.2 6 In addition, it limits the Department's

(E.D. Mich. 1977) (Title IX covers students in programs receiving federal funds), affld, 600
F.2d 581 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Kneeland v. Bloom Township High
School Dist., 484 F. Supp. 1280, 1282 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (Title IX prohibition against sex discrimination applies to education programs receiving federal funds).
19. See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1982) (Department has authority to promulgate regulations to
aid in enforcing Title IX).
20. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.2(g)(1)(ii) (1983). This provision states that federal financial

assistance is a grant or loan of federal monies for "scholarships, loans, grants, wages, or other
funds" extended to any entity for payment to or on behalf of students admitted to that entity,
or extended directly to such students for payment to that entity. See id.
21. See Haffer v. Temple Univ., 524 F. Supp. 531, 540 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (federal funds
granted directly to college constitute federal financial assistance), aft'd, 688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir.
1982).
22. See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 463-64 (1973) (textbooks given to students
constitute federal financial assistance to the school, although indirect).
23. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.2(g)(l)(ii) (1983).
24. See id. § 106.2(h). This regulation states:
"Recipient" means any State or political subdivision thereof, or any instrumentality of a
state or political subdivision thereof, any public or private agency, institution, or organization, or other entity, or any person, to whom Federal financial assistance is extended
directly or through another recipient and which operates an education program or activity which receives or benefits from such assistance, including any subunit, successor, assignee, or transferee thereof.
Id.
25. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, - U.S ....
103 S. Ct. 3062, 3069, 77 L. Ed. 2d 721,
730 (1983) (statute allowing parents tax deduction for children's elementary and secondary
school costs comparable to aid to schools); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 783 (1973) (tuition reimbursements given parents of children in private schools held to
constitute aid to schools); Hillsdale College v. Department of H.E.W., 696 F.2d 418, 429-30
(6th Cir. 1982) (student receipt of federal student loans and grants constituted aid to school),
vacated, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 1673, 80 L. Ed. 2d 149 (1984).
26. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1982); see also 34 C.F.R. § 106.1 (1983) (recognizes that Title
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authority to terminate financial assistance to the particular program which
fails to comply with the regulations. 27 The definition of program, however,
has never been adequately determined by a court. 21 Some courts have interpreted program under Title IX narrowly by holding that Title IX only applies to specific programs receiving federal financial assistance within an
institution and not to the entire institution. 29 Alternatively, in at least two
cases, program has been given a broad interpretation, with the court holding
that Title IX applies to an entire institution rather than the specific program
directly benefited. 3 °
In Grove City College v. Bell,3 the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether student receipt of federal financial assistance

IX is program specific). Several cases interpreting Title IX have recognized that Title IX is
program-specific. See, e.g., North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 514 (1982) (Title
IX is program-specific prohibition of discrimination based on sex); Iron Arrow Honor Soc'y v.
Heckler, 702 F.2d 549, 552 (5th Cir.)(Title IX's prohibition of sex-based discrimination is
program-specific), vacated as moot, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 373, 78 L. Ed. 2d 58 (1983); Othen v.
Ann Arbor School Bd., 507 F. Supp. 1376, 1381 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (Title IX is programspecific act), affld, 699 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1983). See generally Note, Title VI, Title IX, and the
Private University: Defining "Recipient" and "Program or Part Thereof" 78 MICH. L. REv.
608, 617-25 (1980) (discussion of Title IX's program-specific character).
27. See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1982) (termination authority of Department limited to particular program receiving federal funds which fails to comply with requirements of Title IX).
28. See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 540 (1982) (Supreme Court did
not undertake to define program).
29. See, e.g., Hillsdale College v. Department of H.E.W., 696 F.2d 418, 430 (6th Cir.
1982) (student receipt of financial aid resulted in federal financial assistance to student loan
and grant program, not entire institution), vacated, - U.S. -_, 104 S. Ct. 1673, 80 L. Ed. 2d
149 (1984); Rice v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 663 F.2d 336, 339 (1st Cir. 1981)
(federal aid to law school work study program did not constitute federal aid to entire law
school for purposes of Title IX), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 928 (1982); University of Richmond v.
Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321, 333 (E.D. Va. 1982) (federal library resource grant received by school
did not grant Department power to regulate and investigate school's athletic program).
30. See Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 700 (3d Cir. 1982), ajf'd, - U.S.
104 S. Ct. 1211, 79 L. Ed. 2d 516 (1984). The Third Circuit found that in the case of student
receipt of federal grants the program to be defined is the entire institution. See id. at 700; see
also Haffer v. Temple Univ., 524 F. Supp. 531, 538 (E.D. Pa. 1981), afid, 688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir.
1982). In Haffer, the court held the receipt of federal funds by the school activated Title IX
coverage prohibiting sex discrimination in the entire institution, including the athletic program
which received no federal funds. See id. at 538. The court offered an example of the abuses it
was trying to prevent with its decision:
A university. . . cannot use federal money to support one. . . program, such as the law
school, run that program in perfect compliance with . . . Title IX, transfer nonfederal
money from the law school budget to the budget of another program, such as the medical
school, and deny . . . women admission to the medical school.
See id. at 538.
31. - U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 1211, 79 L. Ed. 2d 516 (1984).
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brings an entire educational institution under Title IX regulation. 32 The majority determined that the BEOGs received by students at Grove City College constituted aid to the college. 33 The Court found that the aid, though
indirect, triggered Title IX coverage because the statute makes no distinction
between direct and indirect aid.34 The majority held, however, that, under
the facts before the court, Title IX only applied to the student financial aid
program.3 5 In reaching this conclusion, the majority stated that the BEOGs
benefited the financial aid program,3 6 but there was no evidence that the
federal aid received by the students resulted in the diversion of funds from
the financial aid program to other areas within the institution.37 The majority reasoned that Congress intended the term program to be given a narrow
interpretation and thus limited the Act's protection to the specific program
benefitted. 3' This holding affirmed the Department's right to terminate BE-

32. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1214, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 523. The Court stated the issues
before it as follows:
[W]e must decide, first, whether Title IX applies at all to Grove City College. . . . If so,
we must identify the 'education program or activity' at Grove City that is 'receiving Federal financial assistance' and determine whether federal assistance to that program may be
terminated solely because the College violates the Department's regulations by refusing to
execute an Assurance of Compliance with Title IX. Finally, we must consider whether
the application of Title IX to Grove City infringes the First Amendment rights of the
College or its students.
Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1214, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 523.
33. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1220, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 529. The Court found that the
BEOGs were indirect aid to the college. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1220, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 529.
34. See id. at -., 104 S. Ct. at 1218-20, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 528-29. The Court, citing Senator
Bayh's statement that Title IX permits termination of all aid from the department controlling
federal financial assistance to education, found that the language of Title IX contained no
distinction between direct and indirect assistance. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1218-20, 79 L.
Ed. 2d at 528-29. In addition, the Court found that the legislative history of Title IX makes no
such distinction either. See id. at -., 104 S. Ct. at 1218-20, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 528-29. Title IX's
postenactment history was also examined. The Court noted that regulations promulgated pursuant to Title IX, which were very broad and included direct and indirect assistance" were laid
before the Congress for determination of whether they were consistent with congressional intent. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1219, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 529. None of the regulations was
disapproved, thus showing that the regulations were consistent with congressional intent. See
id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1219, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 529.
35. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1221-22, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 530.
36. See id. at -' 104 S. Ct. at 1222, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 532.
37. See id. at -' 104 S. Ct. at 1222, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 532. The Court recognized that
substantial portions of students' BEOGs reach Grove City's general operating budget, but
asserted there was no finding of any persuasive evidence that Congress intended that Title IX
apply to the entire institution. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1222, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 532.
38. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1221, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 531. The Court stated that it found
no persuasive evidence of a congressional intent that the requirements of Title IX apply to the
entire institution due to students' receipt of federal aid. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1222, 79 L.
Ed. 2d at 531.
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OGs to Grove City College's students if the Financial Aid Department failed
to execute an Assurance of Compliance.39 Additionally, the Court concluded such regulation did not infringe upon the first amendment rights of
Grove City College or its students.4°
Justice Brennan, concurring in part, dissented on the issue of the narrow
reading given Title IX by the majority." He argued that earlier decisions of
the Supreme Court had established a broad reading of Title IX. 42 The legislative history of Title IX was cited as demonstrating Congress' intent to
cover an entire institution whenever an educational program within the institution was receiving federal financial assistance.43 Justice Stevens, concurring in part and in the result, refused to join in the majority's holding that
the program receiving federal financial assistance was solely the student financial aid program because such a holding constituted an advisory opinion
predicated on speculation." Justice Powell concurred in the holding of the
Court, but expressed his belief that the case against Grove City College was

39. See id.at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1222-23, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 533. The Court held that the
Assurance of Compliance requested by the Department was consistent with Title IX's program-specific requirements, and the student financial aid program at Grove City College was
required to execute an Assurance. See id. at -. , 104 S. Ct. at 1222, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 532.
40. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1223, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 533. The Court recognized that
Congress does not violate the first amendment rights of the college or its students when it
attaches clear and reasonable conditions to federal funds that educational institutions are not
required to accept. See id. at -, 104 S.Ct. at 1223, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 533.
41. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1226-36, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 537-51 (Brennan, J., concurring in
part & dissenting in part).
42. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1226-31, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 537-43 (Brennan, J., concurring in
part & dissenting in part). Justice Brennan argued that a broad interpretation of Title IX was
required based on two prior Supreme Court rulings: North Haven Bd. ofEduc. v. Bell, which
held that employment was protected by Title IX and recognized the need to interpret Title IX
broadly, and Cannon v. University of Chicago, which held that there was a private cause of
action under Title IX and recognized Title IX's broad scope. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1226,
79 L. Ed. 2d at 537 (Brennan, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part) (citing North Haven
Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982), and Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S.
677, 699 (1979)).
43. See id. at -_,104 S. Ct. at 1227-29, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 538-40 (Brennan, J., conctirring in
part & dissenting in part). Justice Brennan recognized three points: the Supreme Court's
recognition that Title IX is to be given a broad interpretation, the postenactment history of
Title IX, and congressional intent that there be no difference between direct and indirect financial aid. See id.at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1226-35, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 537-48 (Brennan, J., concurring in
part & dissenting in part).
44. See id. at -, 104 S.Ct. at 1225, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 536 (Stevens, J., concurring in part &
concurring in the result). Justice Stevens argued that the Court did not have to hold that Title
IX applied only to the student financial aid program. See id.at -, 104 S.Ct. at 1225, 79 L.
Ed. 2d at 536 (Stevens, J., concurring in part & concurring in the result). The Assurance of
Compliance requires only that Grove City comply with Title IX to the extent applicable to it,
and since the Secretary construes that statute as applicable only to the financial aid program,
the Court need only rule on whether Grove City is required to file an Assurance of Compli-
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an example of government overzealousness.4 5
In Grove City, the Supreme Court adopted a narrow interpretation of the
statutory phrase "education program or activity" by holding that coverage
of Title IX was limited to the student financial aid program.46 The Court
began its analysis of Title IX's program-specific language by stating that if
Grove City College had participated in the BEOG program through the
Regular Disbursement System, the specific education program or activity
which received federal financial assistance would be the student financial aid
program.4 7 The only difference between the Regular and Alternate Disbursement Systems was one of means, with the result being the same under
either method.4" The Court reasoned that BEOGs administered through the
Alternate Disbursement System must, therefore, also benefit only the student financial aid program.4 9
The Court failed to cite any authority, however, to support this fundamental assertion.5" The purpose of the BEOG is to assist eligible students in
meeting the costs of a postsecondary education, not to benefit a college's
student financial aid program. 5 When a student receives a BEOG, the
money is used to pay educational expenses, including tuition, room and
board, books and supplies, and other expenses.52 The result of the BEOG
program is that federal monies are distributed throughout a school.53 The
student financial aid office is merely a conduit through which federal monies
pass to students for meeting education costs.54 The Court stated that the
fact that federal funds reach the college's general operating budget cannot

ance. See id. at

-,

104 S. Ct. at 1225, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 536 (Stevens, J., concurring in part &

concurring in the result).
45. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1223-24, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 534-35 (Powell, J., concurring).
46. Compare id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1222, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 532 (narrow holding applying
Title IX only to specific program benefited) with Haffer v. Temple Univ., 524 F. Supp. 533, 540

(broad holding applying Title IX to entire university, including athletic program which received no federal aid), affd, 688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982).
47. See Grove City College v. Bell, - U.S..... 104 S. Ct. 1211, 1220-21, 79 L. Ed. 2d
516, 530-31 (1984).

48. See id. at .. ,104 S. Ct. at 1221, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 531.
49. See id. at ._,104 S. Ct. at 1221, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 531.
50. See id. at -' 104 S. Ct. at 1220-21, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 530-31.
51. See 20 U.S.C. § 1070 (1982). This provision establishes the BEOG and states that the
purpose of the BEOG is to provide eligible students with the means necessary to meet the costs

of postsecondary education. See id.; see also 34 C.F.R. § 690.1 (1983); S. REP. No. 882, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4713, 4722.
52. See OFFICE OF STUDENT FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., FEDERAL
STUDENT FINANCIAL AID HANDBOOK 9-13 (1984).

53. See id. at 9-13.
54. See id. at 22 (student financial aid office processes financial aid applications and disburses financial aid awards to students).
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subject Grove City College to institution-wide coverage." This statement
cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court's earlier recognition of Title
IX's purpose of
avoiding the use of federal resources to support discrimina56
practices.
tory
The intent of Congress regarding the phrase "education program or activity" has been examined by several courts." The Supreme Court has previously recognized that Title IX is to be given a broad scope.5" In Grove City,
however, the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of Title IX relying only on
a sparse legislative history and no case law.59 In response, Senator Kennedy
has introduced the Civil Rights Act of 1984 into Congress with the purpose

104 S. Ct. 1211, 1222, 79 L. Ed. 2d
55. See Grove City College v. Bell, - U.S ....
516, 532 (1984). The Court cites to no authority supporting its narrow interpretation of Title
IX. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1222, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 532. Previously, however, the Court had
recognized the need to "accord [Title IX] a sweep as broad as its language." See North Haven
Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982) (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787,
801 (1966)). The Court adopted a broad interpretation of Title IX in holding that it applied to
employment discrimination in education. See id. at 530. The Court based its broad decision
on an analysis of Title IX's language, legislative history, and postenactment history. See id. at
520-35.
104 S. Ct. 1211, 1222, 79 L. Ed.
56. Compare Grove City College v. Bell, - U.S .....
2d 516, 531-32 (1984) (although substantial portions of federal aid received by school reaches
general operating budget, Title IX only prevents sex discrimination in student financial aid
program) with Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979) (purpose of Title IX
to avoid using any federal resources to support discrimination).
57. See Haffer v. Temple Univ., 524 F. Supp. 531, 538 (E.D. Pa. 1981), affid, 688 F.2d 14
(3d Cir. 1982). The college received direct federal financial assistance and the school's athletic
program received no direct federal funds, but since the court found that the entire institution
was the program benefited, the court held that the athletic program was subject to Title IX
coverage. See id. at 538; see also Rice v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 663 F.2d
336, 339 (1st Cir. 1981) (aid received by law school work study program constituted aid to that
particular program only), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 928 (1982); University of Richmond v. Bell,
543 F. Supp. 321, 327 (E.D. Va. 1982) (federal grant to library did not constitute aid to any
other program or division of university). See generally Note, Title IX of the 1972 Education
Amendments: Harmonizing Its Restrictive Language With Its Broad Remedial Purpose, 51
FORDHAM L. REV. 1043, 1059-61 (1983) (discussion of interpretation of Title IX's programspecific language).
58. See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982) (Title IX must be
accorded a broad sweep).
104 S. Ct. 1211, 1221, 79 L. Ed. 2d
59. See Grove City College v. Bell, - U.S .....
516, 532 (1984). The legislative history does show that Title IX was intended to have a broad
reach, as evidenced by Senator Bayh's statement that Title IX's broad objective was to "root
out" sex discrimination as thoroughly as possible. See 118 CONG. REC. 5804 (1972) (statement
of Sen. Bayh). The impact of Title IX was to be "far reaching." See id. at 5808 (statements of
Sen. Bayh). Senator Bayh's statements, being those of the bill's sponsor, are an authoritative
guide to the statute's construction. See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 52627 (1982). There is still no specific evidence in the legislative history of exactly what is meant
by "education program or activity." See id. at 520-21. However, it should be noted that
Congress did not disapprove of the broad rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to Title
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of clarifying that body's intent." The proposed act is intended to prevent
the anticipated effects of the Grove City decision. 6' The main effect feared is
that since there is now no federal law comprehensively prohibiting sex discrimination in education which receives federal assistance, an institution
such as Grove City College could discriminate against women in many of its
programs. 62 For example, an English professor could offer after class tutoring only to men, and women's intercollegiate athletics teams could receive
less money than men's teams in the same sports. 63 This discrimination
could
exist inspite of the fact that the financial aid office is covered by Title
64
IX.
Title IX is not the only antidiscrimination provision affected by the Grove
City decision. 65 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,66 which prohibits
IX. See Grove City College v. Bell, - U.S ....
104 S. Ct. 1211, 1219, 79 L. Ed. 2d 516,
529 (1984).
60. See S. 2568, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. 4582-88 (1984). This bill would
replace the phrase "program or activity" in Title IX with the word "recipients," thus removing the program-specific language from the statute. See id. at 4588. The purpose of the proposed act is to reverse the decision in Grove City because that decision was narrower than
Congress intended. See 130 CONG. REC. 4585 (1984) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). Evidence
that the Supreme Court's decision in Grove City was inconsistent with congressional intent
could be found in the statement of Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole: "Everyone wants to
reverse the Grove City decision. I don't know of any senator who doesn't want to reverse the
Grove City decision." See N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1984, at 13, col. 4. The Civil Rights Act of
1984 was approved by the House of Representatives in June 1984, and the Senate suspended
consideration of the Act in 1984, at the end of the second session of the 98th Congress. See
Wall St. J., Oct. 3, 1984, at 3, col. 2.
61. See 130 CONG. REC. 4585-86 (1984) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (Grove City decision
will allow sex discrimination in programs which receive federal financial assistance). The Civil
Rights Act of 1984 is evidence that the Supreme Court's decision in Grove City did not comport with congressional intent. See id. at 4585. Where a former statute, such as Title IX, is
amended, some courts have held that the amendment is good evidence of the legislature's
intent in enacting the original statute. See Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444
U.S. 572, 596 (1980) (views of subsequent congresses are entitled to significant weight in determining legislative intent); see also Russ v. Wilkins, 624 F.2d 914, 924 (9th Cir. 1980) (subsequent legislation declaring intent of previous enactments should be given due consideration).
But see Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 117 (1980)
(subsequent legislative history rarely overrides statute's reasonable interpretation).
62. See 130 CONG. REC. 4586 (1984) (programs in college which benefit from federal
financial assistance could discriminate on basis of sex because school receives federal funds
from student aid program).
63. See id. at 4586.
64. See Grove City College v. Bell, - U.S.
104 S. Ct. 1211, 1222, 79 L. Ed. 2d 516,
532 (1984). The financial aid office, as the specific program benefited, is the only subunit of the
institution which must comply with Title IX's non-discriminatory provisions.
65. See id. at 4585-86. Since the Grove City decision is based on the interpretation of the
statutory language, "program or activity receiving federal financial assistance," all federal statutes with a scope determined by the same program-specific language will be limited by the
interpretation used in Grove City. See id. at 4586.
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discrimination on the basis of race, section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation
Act, 67 which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability, and the Age
Discrimination Act of 1975,68 which prohibits discrimination on the basis of
age, all have program-specific language identical to that of Title IX. 69 The
scope of all of these acts could conceivably be limited by reasoning analogous to that used in Grove City to allow discrimination in institutions that
benefit from federal assistance.7" The Civil Rights Act of 1984 would amend

all of the civil rights statutes by removing the program-specific language
from them. 7' The effect of this bill would be to subject an entire institution
to coverage under the four affected civil rights acts whenever a subunit of the
institution received federal financial assistance.72 Passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 198473 will render ineffective the Supreme Court's decision in Grove
City by broadly defining the scope of benefit of federal assistance to include
the entire institution.74
The decision in Grove City narrowed the scope of Title IX. The effect of
the decision is that it is now possible for an education program or activity
that receives no direct federal financial assistance, but indirectly benefits
from federal aid, to discriminate on the basis of sex without violating any

66. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982).
67. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). This provision prohibits discrimination based on disability in
"any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." See id.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 6102 (1982). This provision prohibits discrimination based on age in
"any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." See id.
69. See 130 CONG. REC. 4586 (1984); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982) (program-specific prohibition of sex-based discrimination in education); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982) (programspecific prohibition of racial discrimination); 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982) (program-specific prohibition of discrimination based on disability); 42 U.S.C. § 6102 (1982) (program-specific prohibition of age-based discrimination); see also 130 CONG. REC. 4596 (1984).
70. See id. at 4586. The Grove City decision's narrow interpretation of "program or activity" could be used to limit not only Title IX, but also other civil rights statutes. See id. at
4586. After Grove City was decided, William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General
for Civil Rights at the Department of Justice, stated that he believed that Grove City would
apply to other civil rights statutes. See id. at 4586. The result of this is that governmental
protection from discrimination provided to minorities, the disabled, and the elderly in federally
assisted activities will be as limited as the protection provided under Title IX. See id. at 4586.
71. See id. at 4586. The Act would amend each of the four civil rights statutes by deleting "program or activity" where it appears in each of those statutes and replacing it with
"recipient." See id. at 4586.
72. See id. at 4586. The effect of deleting "program or activity" from each of the four
civil rights statutes and replacing it with "recipient" is to prevent an entire institution from
discriminating if one or more of its parts is receiving federal funds. See id. at 4586.
73. S. 2568, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. 4588 (1984).
74. See 130 CONG. REC. 4585 (1984). "The purpose of the [Civil Rights Act of 1984]
• . . is to eliminate the inappropriately restrictive interpretation imposed by the Grove City
decision and reaffirm the legal safeguards available under these civil rights statutes." Id. at
4585.
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federal law. This result is in conflict with the purpose of Title IX, which is
to prevent the use of federal monies to aid in financing discriminatory practices. The Court's decision also limits the effectiveness of other programspecific civil rights statutes. Grove City is based in part on the Court's interpretation of Title IX's legislative history concerning its scope. The Court
found a narrow scope reaching only the specific program benefitted; but the
introduction of the Civil Rights Act of 1984 shows that legislative intent
may be that Title IX be given a broad scope in order to reach the entire
institution. Passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1984 would accomplish this
result and nullify the legal effect of the Grove City decision.
John F. Carroll
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